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A primary goal of any theory of consciousness is to provide an informative account of what makes
the difference between conscious and nonconscious mental states. Typically, whether or not a
given theory is successful in this regard is measured with respect to its ability to explain what it
is for paradigmatically sensory states, for example, visual, auditory, or somatosensory states, to be
conscious. And it is often assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, that whatever account is supplied
for such states can be safely generalized to accommodate other types of mental state as well.
Here I challenge this assumption as it relates to Jesse Prinz’s (2000, 2012) Attended Intermediate-
level Representation (AIR) theory of consciousness. In particular, I raise doubts about whether
the theory in its present form can account for conscious intentions, largely stemming from a pair
of its core commitments. First, the AIR theory has it that “consciousness arises when and only
when intermediate-level representations are modulated by attention” (Prinz, 2012, p. 89). Second,
Prinz defends the view that “all consciousness is perceptual” (Prinz, 2012, p. 150). In other words,
all conscious states are sensory states. So, the AIR theorist is faced with the following dilemma:
either conscious intentions are intermediate-level sensory representations to which we can attend
or, despite appearances to the contrary, our intentions are never conscious. I’ll present some reasons
to be skeptical of the viability of both of these options, which, taken together, suggest that the AIR
theory does not, as it stands, have the resources to explain conscious intentions.
Before getting to these concerns, though, it will be useful to clarify what Prinz
means by “intermediate-level,” “sensory,” and “attended” representations. An intermediate-level
representation is defined relative to high-level and low-level representations in terms of the degree
of specificity of its content. So, for example, in vision, high-level states represent categorical
features of objects in a viewpoint-invariant way, whereas low-level states represent detailed local
features of objects like edges and orientation, and intermediate-level states represent object features
such as boundaries and contours from a specific viewpoint. When such states are modulated by
attention, they are made available to working memory for further processing, which allows these
representations to be used in further capacities like verbal report and reasoning. Finally, a sensory
state for Prinz refers to a state with a representational format that is specific to a sensory modality,
which is itself construed as a dedicated input system (see also Prinz, 2007).
Given these parameters, why not simply view conscious intentions as attended intermediate-
level sensory states? Indeed, Prinz (2012) pursues a parallel strategy in order to explain how it is
that we can have conscious thoughts, even though thoughts are themselves high-level states. He
maintains that thoughts are conscious as long as they are “encoded in sensory vehicles and have
no qualities above and beyond their sensory qualities” (p. 151). In particular, Prinz holds that a
thought can be “rendered conscious” by forming an intermediate-level sensory image of what it
represents, and attending to that state. So, for example, my thought that Paris is beautiful in the
spring is conscious when I form a sensory image of, say, the Eiffel Tower and the sun shining upon
it. Analogously, perhaps the AIR theory might accommodate conscious intentions by viewing them
as states that become conscious when one forms and attends to an appropriately related sensory
image.
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This proposal may seem attractive, but it faces some serious
difficulties. For one, we sometimes form conscious intentions
without any accompanying sensory imagery. Upon realizing that
I am out of milk, I might form an intention to go to the store
later without visualizing my future action. Nonetheless, I might
report my intention and use it in the service of further practical
reasoning to plan out the rest of my day. On just about every
other theory of consciousness, the AIR theory included, only
conscious states are accessed and utilized in this way. So it seems
that I can have a conscious intention without its being encoded
in any sensory vehicle.
But perhaps one will not be moved by this concern because,
one may insist, even if some of our conscious intentions are
unaccompanied by visual imagery, they are accompanied by
“inner speech,” which is properly viewed as a form of verbal
imagery, and thus sensory imagery. I find this suggestion
implausible. Sometimes we consciously intend to do something
without having yet put the intention into words, even in inner
speech. But even if one denies this, there is the further problem,
that Prinz recognizes, of capturing the attitudinal component
of a conscious intention via such verbal imagery. Rendering
conscious the content of an intention by way of verbal imagery
may be possible, but we also need a way to explain consciously
intending to do something rather than, say, consciously predicting
that we will do it, or consciously desiring to do it, which content-
wise may look the same. Verbal imagery is not up to this task.
Prinz’s (2012) solution here is to appeal to emotions for
differentiating, in a sensory way, the attitudes of our conscious
mental states. Applying this to the case of desire, Prinz writes:
“If I want it to be the case that my candidate wins, I will
feel nervous anticipation, and the thought of victory will instill
delight, while the thought of defeat will usher in waves of despair.
On experiencing any of these fluctuating feelings, I may report
that I desire a victory” (p. 164). But our conscious intentions
do not have a signature emotional profile that we can appeal to
in order to determine that we are intending to do something
as opposed to desiring to do it. To be clear, I am not here
denying that intentions involve or are accompanied by affective
or motivational qualities—perhaps that’s true. Nor am I denying
that such qualities would be properly construed as sensory
qualities—perhaps that’s true as well. The worry, rather, is that
whatever sensory affective or motivational qualities they may
involve or be accompanied by will not suffice to distinguish an
intention to do something from a desire to do it, since a desire
will be accompanied by those very same types of qualities.
In addition, it’s worth stressing that even if these worries
were successfully addressed, the present proposal would
still not actually explain how a nonconscious intention
becomes a conscious intention. Any conscious sensory images
corresponding to the content of nonconscious intentions would
plainly be distinct states from those intentions, since the
intentions themselves are not sensory images. (This holds true
for Prinz’s treatment of conscious thoughts as well.) But then the
nonconscious intention itself would still fail to be conscious, and
so it is difficult to see how this proposal helps with our initial
challenge. Indeed, this worry equally applies to Prinz’s account of
conscious thought.
Another general strategy available to Prinz, as mentioned,
is to deny that intentions are ever conscious, and to hold
instead that we are in error whenever we take ourselves to be
consciously intending. Indeed, Prinz seems sympathetic to this
idea, explicitly entertaining the view that, “. . .we are not directly
aware of action decisions, and to that extent, conscious will is
an illusion” (p. 199). On this proposed view, we never form
conscious intentions prior to action, but we engage in post-hoc
reconstructive inferences that convince us that we do.
As evidence for this hypothesis, Prinz discusses some
experimental work carried out by Lau et al. (2007). The authors
used a Libet-style (see Libet et al., 1983) paradigm, asking
participants seated in front of a clock to report the time
at which they became aware of deciding to act. They then
applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the pre-
supplementary motor area either immediately after the action
was performed or 200msec after. The surprising result was
that participants’ judgments of when they first became aware of
deciding to act were shifted backwards in time on the TMS trials.
In other words, when TMSwas administered, they reported being
aware of deciding to act at an earlier time compared with trials
where no TMS was administered. Lau et al. (2007) conclude that,
“. . . the perceived onset of intention depends, at least in part, on
neural activity that takes place after the execution of action” (p.
81). On the basis of these results, Prinz speculates that, “[f]or all
we know, conscious decisions [. . . ] may arise after actions have
taken place and then get erroneously backdated to earlier points
in time” (p. 198).
But it’s not clear how this would help with the present issue,
since Prinz would still be faced with the task of explaining what
it means for a conscious decision to arise after the action. I
have already raised concerns for viewing such states as attended
intermediate-level sensory states, and it’s not clear what other
options are available to the AIR theorist.
Of course, Prinz need not be wedded to this version of
the reconstructive hypothesis. He has the option of saying
instead that no conscious decision ever arises, even after the
action, just the reconstructive inference. But this version of the
reconstructive hypothesis is not supported by the Lau et al.
(2007) results. It may be that our timing judgments related to
intentions can be influenced by events occurring after the action,
but while this may suggest that we are sometimes wrong about
precisely when we actually form intentions to act—something
that would hardly be surprising given how rare such judgments
are—it provides no evidence whatsoever for the claim that we are
sometimes wrong about whether we formed an intention at all,
at some point prior to the action. To bring this point home, it
is worth point out that analogous findings of subjective timing
distortions pertaining to the onset of sensory experiences, among
them Libet’s own (see Libet et al., 1979), provide no evidence that
such experiences do not take place, or that we are sometimes
wrong in reporting that they occurred. Nor are they taken to
provide such evidence. There is plainly a difference between a
judgment that a mental event occurred at time t and a judgment
that a mental event occurred at all. And we have no reason to be
skeptical of our ability to make the latter type of judgment based
on the Lau et al. (2007) results.
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Prinz has a reply available to him here, for there is one
putative source of evidence for the reconstructive hypothesis
that I have yet to address, and this comes from the work of the
late psychologist Daniel Wegner. One of Wegner’s most widely
discussed studies is his “I Spy” study (Wegner and Wheatley,
1999; Wegner, 2002), which appears to show that we can also
sometimes be confused into thinking that we intend an action
that we do not intend. This would help bolster the claim that, not
only are we sometimes wrong about the timing of our intentions,
but about whether or not we intended to do something in the first
place.
Briefly, in Wegner and Wheatley’s (1999) study, participants
were seated across from a confederate, and asked to jointly
move a computer mouse—in a “ouija board” type set-up—that
controlled a cursor on a computer screen positioned nearby,
on which was displayed a number of objects. The participants
and the confederate would move the cursor around the screen
together and, after approximately 30 s, they were instructed to
stop and rate the extent to which they felt they intended the stop
to on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 (“0” indicating “I allowed
the stop to happen” and “100” indicating “I intended to make
the stop”). What the participants didn’t know is that on some
trials the confederate was in full control of the object that the
cursor stopped upon. Nonetheless, when participants heard the
name of the target object over headphones just before these
stops, they were more likely to give higher ratings on the scale.
The authors conclude that they “perceived the forced stops as
intended” (p. 489).
But, as many have at this point stressed (Nahmias, 2005;
Shepherd, 2013; Mylopoulos and Lau, 2014), this conclusion
is not supported by the results of the experiment—so much
so that it is somewhat surprising how often this study is
cited as evidence for the reconstructive hypothesis. Perhaps the
strongest objection to this interpretation is that, on average, the
participants barely rated the forced stops as over halfway between
being allowed and being intended. This strongly suggests that
they did not view themselves as having consciously intended
the stops but were, if anything, uncertain about their causal
contributions to the stops. And this is hardly unexpected
given the highly ambiguous context within they were asked
to act.
In sum, I think there is a significant challenge here for the AIR
theorist. It does not seem that conscious intentions are sensory
states, and it does not seem that we have any reason to deny that
they exist. But if so, then the AIR theory cannot account for all
conscious mental states.
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